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Foreign Policy Export Controls: A Proposal
for Reform
Donald E. &Kieffer
L Introduction
On May 1, 1985, several U.S. companies were stunned to receive
notification that they had one week to sever their commercial ties
with Nicaragua.' Although relations between the United States and
the Sandinista regime had been deteriorating for some time,2 there
had been few hints of imminent imposition of economic sanctions.3
Partner, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Washington, D.C. B.A. 1968, University of
Colorado; J.D. 1971, Georgetown University Law Center.
I Exec. Order No. 12,515; 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985). The text of the order reads
as follows:
tahibiting Thde and Certain Other Transactions Involvng Niaragua
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
191 et seq.), and section 301 of Tide 3 of the United States Code,
I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that
the policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute an unu-
sual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of
the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that
threat.
I hereby prohibit all imports into the United States of goods and services of
Nicaraguan orign; all exports from the United States of goods to or destined
for Nicaragua, except those destined for the Organized democratic resistance,and transactions relating thereto.I hereby prohibit Nicaraguan air carriers from engaging in air transportationto or from points in the United States, and transactions relating thereto.
In addition, I hereby prohibit vessels of Nicaraguan registry from enteringinto United States ports, and transacti ns relating thereto.The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and authorized to employ all pow-
ers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to
carry out the purposes of this Order.
The Prhibitions set forth in this Order shall be effective as of 12:01 am.,Eastern Daylight Tme, May 7, 1985, and shall be transmitted to the Con-
gress and published in the Fdera raRegister.
ps/tRonald Reagan
THE WHITE HOUSE
May 1, 1985.2 See U.S. Weigh lmpactofa Nicaraguan Embargo, Chritian Sci. Monitor, May 1, 1985,
The Reagan Administration generally has opposed unilateral economic sanctions.In 1981 it lifted the U.S. grain embargo against the Soviet Union imposed by PresidentCarter in retaliation for the invasion of Afghanistan. and continues to resist the imposition
of new sanctions against South Africa. Its decision to subject Nicaragua to a trade em-bargo came two weeks after Congress declined to supply 14 million in aid to the rebel
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President Reagan's announcement was unequivocal-stop doing
business immediately. No further commercial contacts with the Nic-
araguan regime would be permitted. Although the amount of U.S.
commercial activity in Nicaragua was not large in an absolute sense,4
the embargo was a severe economic blow to several U.S. companies
which had ongoing business relations with Nicaragua. 5 Shortly after
the Administration's announcement of the embargo, the Sandinista
government announced it had replaced former U.S. suppliers with
other foreign sources.6
The Nicaraguan incident is one of the latest in a long series of
government-imposed trade sanctions against countries whose poli-
cies the United States finds antithetical to its own.7 Some well-
known examples of such sanctions include the Soviet Union's refusal
in 1975 to implement the 1972 trade agreement with the United
States because of restrictions added by Congress--primarily the re-
fusal to extend most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union be-
cause of its restriction on emigration.8 In 1978, the United States
cancelled a computer sale to the Soviet Union and increased licens-
ing restrictions for all U.S. exports of oil technology because of the
Soviet government's arrest and trial of dissidents Aleksandr Ginz-
burg and Anatoly Shcharansky.9 In 1983, both houses of Congress
opposed the export of safety-related spare parts for India's Tarapur
Atomic Power reactors unless "stronger nuclear nonproliferation
Contras. A need emerged to rebuild the Administration's Central American policy, and an
economic trade embargo was one of the available options.
4 In 1984 Nicaragua exported $58.1 million worth of goods to the United States,
mainly bananas, beef, shrimp, and coffee. U.S. exports to Nicaragua totaled $109.8 mil-
lion in 1984, including insecticides and other chemicals, paper, and paper products. Facts
on File, World News Digest, May 3, 1985, at 313 Al. In fact, before the embargo, trade
with the United States accounted for only 14% of Nicaragua's exports and imports, a sig-
nificant drop from 35% in 1980. Hufbauer & Schott, Nicaragua Sanctions: Too Little, Too
Late, Christian Sci. Monitor, May 28, 1985, at 15.
5 The four U.S. shipping companies that carry the bulk of Nicaraguan trade with
North America may lose between $15-$20 million in freight charges per year. Other U.S.
manufacturers, particularly those which export animal and vegetable fats, crop protection
chemicals and fertilizers, electrical machinery, and transport and scientific equipment,
stand to lose an annual market of between $10-$25 million. Nicaragua Eases into New Export
Markets, Fin. Times, May 8, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
6 According to news reports, Latin American suppliers probably will fill the gap in
supplying raw materials, while West and East European manufacturers will become the
principal sources of advanced technology and machinery. See id.; see also Ortega Visits Spain,
Wins Continued Aid, Wash. Post, May 12, 1985, at A22, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Ortega
Visits Spain]; Ortega Says Moscow To Supply More Oil, Wash. Post, May 21, 1985, at A22, col. 3;
Nicaragua Office Moving to Toronto, Wash. Post, May 21, 1985, at A22, col. 3.
7 See C. HUFBAUER &J. ScHorr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND
CURRENT Poucy 6 (1985) ("sanctions have been used on behalf of efforts to protect
human rights, to halt nuclear proliferation, to settle expropriation claims, and to combat
international terrorism ... the United States has played the dominant role as guardian of
its version of global morality").
8 lt at 508-10.
9 Id. at 603.
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guarantees" were obtained.10
While much of the export control debate concerns the types of
restraints that the United States and its allies should place upon tech-
nology transfers to the Soviet bloc," a less-discussed, but perhaps
more important, aspect of export administration is the imposition of
trade sanctions for political rather than security or defense rea-
sons.1 2 This article focuses upon some of the political, economic,
and cultural consequences of restraints placed upon U.S. exporters
and foreign importers for primarily ideological reasons.
H. Overview
While the immediate effect of foreign policy export controls is a
significant decline in export earnings to affected U.S. industries,' 3
the economic impact on the "targeted" country is more difficult to
calculate. 14 Although the stated objective of foreign policy export
controls is generally to force the "target" to make economic or polit-
ical concessions, in most cases economic sanctions fail to accomplish
this result.' 5 The United States rarely has the economic power to
10 Id at 598-99. In addition, the United States has imposed various sanctions and
restrictions on the Soviet Union (in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, interference
in Poland, and the downing of Korean Airline Flight 007), Brazil (in response to its refusal
to accept nuclear safeguards), South Africa (in response to apartheid), Iran (in response to
the taking of U.S. hostages), Libya (in response to its support of terrorism), Cuba (in re-
sponse to the policies of Fidel Castro), and Poland (in response to the declaration of mar-
tial law).
I I The United States is a member of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) which
reviews and restricts certain exports of sensitive technology and equipment which may
have military applications. See Aeppel, The Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical
Study of the COCOM Regime, 1 FLETCHER FORUM 105 (1985).
12 The imposition of restrictions for security or defense purposes is highly conten-
tious with regard to the practical aspects of controls. There has been a longstanding inter-
agency dispute on this issue, principally between the Departments of Commerce and
Defense. The recent reauthorization of the Export Administration Act was a time-consum-
ing process, indicating the controversial nature of the program. Before renewal, the Act
lapsed and the President was forced to declare a national emergency so that controls could
remain in effect. Export controls administered by the United States also have engendered
friction with allies. For example, a major West German exporter of helicopters, Delta-Avia
Fluggerate GmbH, was prohibited, on political grounds, from selling helicopters to North
Korea for civilian use. Delta-Avia also was subjected to U.S. sanctions. The West
Germans protested the unilateral U.S. action. See U.S. Blacklist Upsets West Germans: Helicop-
ter Sale Illustrates Clash on Communist Trade, Int'l Herald Tribune, July 16, 1985, at 1.
Is See Nicaragua Eases into New Export Markets, supra note 5. Domestic firms not only
pay an immediate price when trade flows are disrupted, but also face long-term costs aris-
ing from the uncertainty of doing business abroad. When sanctions are imposed the tar-
get country as well as all of the sender country's trading partners, may be prompted to
seek diversified sources of supplies and alternative partners for joint ventures. G. HuF-
BAUER &J. SCHOTr, supra note 7, at 64-66.
14 See deKieffer, The Purpose of Sanctions, 15 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 205 (1983). To
calculate the cost of economic sanctions to the target country it is necessary to estimate the
initial deprivation of markets, supplies, and finance. Additionally, the "welfare loss" to the
target's economy must be considered in calculating economic costs. G. HUFIIAUER & J.
SCHsOTT, supra note 7, at 60-61.
15 See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 79; see also Moyer & Mabry, Export
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
deny the target country's access to replacement goods from other
major trading countries.' 6 Furthermore, a predictable result of for-
eign policy export controls is to encourage the target to become self-
sufficient in products it previously imported from the United
States. 17
Rarely, however, do U.S. policymakers seriously believe that eco-
nomic sanctions will have a significant economic impact upon the
miscreant.' 8 Rather, the sanctions are usually viewed as a diplomatic
signal-part of the diplomatic "bag of tricks"-to indicate the U.S.
displeasure with another country's policies.' 9 Economic sanctions
represent the "middle ground" in the types of actions available to
the President, which range from the filing of protest notes to the
outright declaration of war.20
In the early part of U.S. diplomatic history, economic sanctions
were rarely employed. Beginning in the 1930s it became clear that
the President had the unilateral power to impose peacetime foreign
policy export controls. 21 As the Cold War progressed and relative
power of the United States declined, policymakers searched for non-
military means to demonstrate the United States commitment to var-
ious ideals. Armed intervention by the United States in the post-war
Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three
Recent Cases, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 142-43 (1983) ("[v]iewing the controls of the past
three years in retrospect, most inflicted less economic injury on the target country than
anticipated").
16 See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 15, at 144-45 ("Controls can totally cut off sources
of supply only if the country imposing controls has a monopoly on the embargoed items or
if alternative suppliers join in the controls. Except in rare cases... the United States has
not possessed a monopoly in the items it has embargoed. More important, in most of the
cases discussed above, the United States was unable to secure the full cooperation of alter-
native supplier countries."); cf. G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 11 ("offsetting
compensation has occurred most conspicuously in episodes where the big powers were
caught up in [an] ideological conflict over the policies of a smaller nation").
17 See G. HuFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, supra note 7, at 687 (in response to U.S. sanctions
against Poland for declaring martial law, Poland announced a planned reorientation of
national priorities to make Poland self-sufficient in agriculture); see also Moyer & Mabry,
supra note 15, at 147 ("the target can often diminish the damage [of economic sanctions]
by... diversifying sources of imports and developing domestic production capabilities");
c. G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 10 ("economic sanctions may unify the target
country both in support of the government and in search of commercial alternatives").
18 Cf. G. HUFBAUER & J. Scorr, supra note 7, at 11 (the limitations on the use of
sanctions are "well known to most policy officials").
19 See When Sanctions Work, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1985, at 15.
20 Other types of sanctions in this diplomatic array include the recall of our ambassa-
dor for "consultations," reduction of embassy staff, termination of airline landing rights,
cancellation of cultural exchanges, and many other diplomatic tools.
21 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In 1934
Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the President to prohibit the sale of muni-
tions and arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, countries then engaged in armed conflict in the
Chaco. The President exercised his authority under the resolution, and Curtiss-Wright
was indicted for conspiracy to sell arms to Bolivia, The Supreme Court held that the Presi-
dent's authority to act under his foreign affairs power did not depend upon an affirmative
grant of power from Congress. Accordingly, the arms embargo was not an unlawful dele-
gation of power as alleged by Curtiss-Wright.
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era has been generally regarded as passe. Thus, for example, there
was little President Carter could do about real or perceived viola-
tions of human rights in Brazil22 or that the United States could do
about the lack of majority rule in Rhodesia.23 The United States
could indicate its displeasure with these regimes, however, by en-
forcing stringent export control regulations against them. Although
the United States could not invade these countries, it could prevent
U.S. citizens and corporations from participating in their markets.
IH. Economic Costs
To dismiss the imposition of foreign policy export controls as
merely symbolic would be both cynical and inaccurate. In most in-
stances in which export controls were imposed, policymakers real-
ized there would be costs. 24 In fact, had there not been such costs
and a demonstrated willingness by the United States to pay them, the
symbols would be far less compelling. 25 A candid analysis of both
the goals and costs of imposing foreign policy export controls would
be refreshing. 26 Rather than suggesting that U.S. sanctions will rep-
resent a devastating "economic blow" to the intended target, a more
morally compelling argument would be recognition by policymakers
that the sanctions may have little economic effect (except upon the
United States). Policymakers should instead point out that the eco-
nomic sanctions are so clearly morally justifiable that U.S. citizens
are willing to suffer the resulting domestic economic harm, even
though such sanctions may have no serious economic effect upon the
target. It is precisely the willingness by the United States to suffer
that gives foreign policy export controls their political-and moral-
"punch." 27
While not uniquely a U.S. phenomenon, the imposition of for-
eign policy export controls is taken much more seriously in the
United States than elsewhere. These controls have become so popu-
lar that politicians are latching onto them as the "sanction of choice"
in their increasing micro-management of U.S. foreign policy. 28 As
22 President's News Conference of Mar. 30, 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 627
(Apr. 3, 1978).
23 U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1340th mtg.) at 7, U.N.
.Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.l (1966) imposed mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, including
prohibitions on certain imports and exports. In 1979, as Rhode'fia moved towards major-
ity rule, sanctions were lifted. This was, however, many years after the original imposition
of restrictions on trade and after an extended internal guerrilla war had been waged.
24 See G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 64-69.
25 See deKieffer. supra note 14, at 207.
26 See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 15, at 143 ("the anticipated harm [of U.S. export
controls] was often expansively ... stated when the controls were announced").
27 See When Sanctions Work, supra note 19, at 15-16 ("[t]his self-denial worked its way
through the markets to traumatize the South African currency more effectively than any act
of congressional lobbying or symbolic act of the [P]resident").28 See, e.g., H.R. 1033, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 677, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
1986]
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with any tool that is overused, however, economic sanctions will tend
to lose their edge if employed too frequently.
Although the new Export Administration Act (the Act) 29 ad-
dresses some of the issues surrounding security-related and foreign
policy export controls, it nevertheless allows the President and the
Congress to take actions motivated by political, as opposed to secur-
ity reasons. There is, however, a new provision which was added to
the Act to protect "contract sanctity." °30 Although this provision is a
significant constraint on the President's authority and results from
great effort by Senator Heinz and other members of Congress, the
effect of the provision in an emergency remains to be seen. The
President may simply impose controls under the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act, s 1 thereby avoiding the contract sanctity
provision altogether.
Although other countries impose economic sanctions for polit-
ical reasons,3 2 few nations take either the sanctions--or them-
selves-as seriously as do U.S. policymakers.33 While some U.S.
officials have been accused of cynicism in imposing sanctions that
(1985) (prohibiting the importation of certain products from Australia and New Zealand);
H.R. 295, 1098, 1133, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (prohibiting the export of certain mili-
tarily significant items to, new loans and new investments in, and the importation of
Krugerrands or other gold or silver coins, coal and uranium from, South Africa).
29 Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120
(to be codified at scattered sections of titles 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 22
U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C. app.).
30 The provision on contract sanctity reads as follows:
(1) Contract Sanctity, Extension of Certain Controls, and Expanded Au-
thority. Section 6 is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(m) Effect on Existing Contracts and Licenses. The President may
not, under this section, prohibit or curtail the export or reexport of goods,
technology, or other information
"(1) in performance of a contract or agreement entered into
before the date on which the President reports to the Congress, pur-
suant to subsection (f) of this section, his intention to impose controls
on the export or reexport of such goods, technology, or other infor-
mation, or
"(2) under a validity license or other authorization issued under
this Act, unless and until the President determines and certifies to the
Congress that-
"(A) a breach of peace poses a serious and direct threat to
the strategic interest of the United States,
"(B) the prohibition or curtailment of such contracts,
agreements, licenses, or authorizations will be instrumental in
remedying the situation posing the direct threat, and
"(C) the export controls will continue only so long as the
direct threat persists."
Id. § 108.
si 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982).
32 One example is the Arab League's economic embargo against Egypt in March,
1979 to show its resistance to President Anwar Sadat's policy for establishing peace with
Israel. See G. HUFBAUER & J. ScHoTr, supra note 7, at 607.
33 For instance, while the Arab League retaliated against Egypt for establishing peace
with Israel by economically boycotting that country, it did not require the withdrawal of
funds from Egyptian banks, nor the establishment of exchange controls. See id
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they know will not "work" in an economic sense, such actions are far
more ingenious than those of some foreign governments which im-
pose sanctions expecting they will be violated in fact and spirit from
the first day.3 4
When the United States adopts economic sanctions, it concomi-
tantly seeks to enforce such measures against its own citizens.3 5
While the degree to which other countries' announced export sanc-
tions are violated is unknown and unascertainable, it is an open se-
cret that some of the United Nations most ardent advocates of
economic sanctions abide by these rules only in the breach.36 Other
countries, primarily in continental Western Europe and the Far East,
take a more "pragmatic" approach to foreign policy export controls,
applying them infrequently.3 7 Although these countries have come
under criticism from other lands clamoring for sanctions against
countries with real or preceived faults, they are at least rarely guilty
of hypocrisy. Although it might be suggested that this approach rep-
resents the triumph of mercantilism over morality, such questions
are better debated in a theological journal.
The effects of politically-motivated export controls on U.S. in-
ternational trade are matters of objective fact. The initial conse-
quences of trade embargoes are predictable. U.S. companies doing
business in the target nation almost immediately lose most or all of
that business.38 Furthermore, the target country reacts predictably.
First, it angrily condemns the country imposing sanctions for inter-
fering in its internal affairs. Next, it announces that the sanctions will
have no effect upon its policies or economy.3 9 Third, it sets out to
34 In response to the United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia, Roger
Hawkins, Rhodesian Minister of Transport and Power, stated on April 26, 1967 that
"whatever any particular government says, of course, is quite different to what their busi-
nessmen do and this is precisely how Rhodesia... is winning the war." lI& at 411.
35 When President Carter took action against the Soviet Union in January, 1980 for
its invasion of Afghanistan, the Commerce Department immediately began to enforce the
imposed restrictions. Seven days after the announcement of U.S. sanctions, this govern-
mental department began a review of high technology strategic goods exports to the
U.S.S.R., and suspended issuance of new licenses and previously issued validated licenses
for goods not yet shipped. Id. at 655.
36 See No Color Bar in South Africa's Trade, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 10, 1978, at
31 ("yet most countries give only lip service to the sanctions"). Id.
37 See G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHoTr, supra note 7, at 9. A recent exception is the French
decision to impose sanctions against South Africa following the declaration of a national
emergency. See Paris Recalls Envoy, Halts Investments in South Africa, Wash. Post, July 25,
1985, at Al, col. 5.
38 See Nicaragua Eases into New Export Markets, supra note 5; see also Moyer & Mabry,
supra note 15, at 151 ("For firms directly involved in the affected transactions [total trans-
action price] translates into lost profits, unrecouped expenses, cancellation charges, and
other incidental costs, such as negotiating expenses.")
39 See, e.g., G. HUMAUER &J. ScHo'rr, supra note 7, at 714. A spokesman at the Turk-
ish Embassy labeled recommendation of sanctions against Turkey "an attempt to interfere
in domestic Turkish politics," and added, "such pressure has never succeeded in the past,
so I don't see why it should now." I41
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enforce literally this statement.
In the wake of U.S. imposed economic sanctions, third-country
businessmen immediately descend upon the affected capital, eagerly
offering their goods and services to replace those denied by the Yan-
quis.40 Some countries (for example Cuba) make a fetish out of their
independence from the United States, extolling the virtues of deal-
ing with such "reliable" suppliers as the Soviet Union.
In addition to replacing U.S. goods and services with those from
other countries, many nations subjected to sanctions are forced to
reanalyze their own resources, often developing indigenous indus-
tries to supply products once provided by imports.4 1 For example,
the arms embargoes imposed against South Africa and Brazil gave
strong impetus to their development of domestic weapons
industries.42
When sanctions are ultimately removed, U.S. firms may find
they have been replaced by foreign suppliers or home-grown entre-
preneurs. Reentering the market is made doubly difficult by the U.S.
company's loss of reputation for reliability. 43 Although most foreign
countries do not blame the U.S. company directly, this is of little
consequence when the domestic supplier is unable to deliver its
goods due to adverse action by the U.S. government. Additionally,
the frequency with which the U.S. authorities have either undertaken
or threatened to undertake economic sanctions has raised real ques-
tions about the general reliability of U.S. companies throughout the
world." The precise economic effect of this loss of national reputa-
tion cannot be calculated, but it is likely to be significant. Given
equally competitive bids from American and third-country suppliers
and the penchant of the United States to restrain trade flows for
political reasons, it would not be unreasonable for a foreign pur-
chaser to prefer a third-country contract.
This factor has induced another phenomenon. Given the rela-
tive portability of many industries, particularly in "sensitive" fields,45
40 For example, when U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union were embargoed following
the invasion of Afghanistan, Argentina increased grain exports to the Soviet Union at pre-
mium prices. See Moyer & Mabry, supra note 15, at 45. Additionally, responding in 1960
to President Eisenhower's ban on exports to Cuba, the Soviet Union began an extensive
program of shipping goods and extending credits to Cuba which has lasted into the 1980s.
See G. HUFBAUER &J. SCHOTT, supra note 7, at 318.
41 See supra note 17.
42 See Third- World LandsJoin Ranks of Arms Exporters, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1981, § 1, at
20, col. 4; Embargo Spurs South Africa To Build Weapons Industry, Wash. Post, July 7, 1981, at
A12, col. 1.
43 See G. HuFBAUER & J. Scnorr, supra note 7, at I 1 ("[o]utcries from U.S. business
... arose as much from the fear of future competitive weakness as 'unreliable suppliers'
.. ).
4See id at 9 (the United States "frequently has deployed sanctions to assert its lead-
ership in world affairs"); see also supra note 13.
45 See Fragile Frontier, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1983, at Fl, col. 5. " Ihe manufacture of
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U.S. firms have increasingly established themselves in countries with
a more mercantile view of foreign policy. Although it would be diffi-
cult to calculate precisely the weight "run-away companies" have
given to the vagaries of U.S. foreign policy export controls in making
their decisions to transplant themselves, it is likely to be a significant
consideration, given the enormous economic costs companies suffer
when these controls are imposed.
Thus, while the short-term effects of foreign policy export con-
trols are more neatly calculable, the long-term effects upon U.S. in-
dustries' reputations for reliability and the long-term loss of jobs in
the United States are more profound.
IV. A Proposal for Reform
While the adverse effects in the United States of politically-in-
spired export controls are undeniable, the United States should not
necessarily abandon these measures as an instrument of national pol-
icy. Indeed, given the more severe limitations on other types of
sanctions,46 trade embargoes often represent the only meaningful
diplomatic gesture short of armed force. 47
Furthermore, because the United States is (rightly) perceived as
a touchstone of international morality, its trade sanctions are more
essential as foreign policy tools than other countries'. The political
and moral principles that motivate domestic policymakers-and U.S.
citizens--though sometimes naive, are deeply felt. U.S. citizens also
seem less troubled than other Westerners in expressing their philo-
sophical beliefs by self sacrifice. Thus, to suggest that the United
States completely eschew export control measures runs contrary to
U.S. ideals and severely limits the policy options available to U.S.
leaders.
What is needed, however, is a realistic standard before the deci-
sion to impose export controls is made. Although the total burden
to U.S. industry of politically-motivated sanctions is incalculable, the
short- to medium-range costs are monetarily ascertainable. To the
extent that foreign policy decisions benefit all U.S. citizens, it seems
incongruous that a specific group-those doing business in the tar-
get country-should be expected to bear the entire cost of these de-
cisions. Moreover, once these costs are borne, there is little
integrated circuits . .. began moving to Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore about 15
years ago." Id
46 Less extreme measures, such as a diplomatic slap on the wrist, "may not hit where
it hurts," G. HuFEAuR & J. ScHorr, supra note 7, at 10, and covert action or military
measures may be both politically and economically excessive. See id See aho Moyer &
Mabry, supra note 15, at 169 ("[export controls] also offer obvious advantages over the use
of military force and various diplomatic actions").
47 See G. HUFBAUER &J. ScnoTr, supra note 7, at 10; see also Moyer & Mabry, supra note
15, at 169.
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provision under U.S. law for compensating the companies prohibited
from trading by the imposed sanctions.
Recently, the imposition of trade sanctions against other coun-
tries entails no cost to the U.S. government. Yet, the same source
that imposes the sanctions concurrently deprives U.S. business of
enormous revenues. If the U.S. government feels morally or politi-
cally compelled to take diplomatic action against our trading part-
ners, it is incumbent upon the government to absorb the costs of its
decision. To accomplish this objective, an "economic impact state-
ment" should be required before either the Executive or the Con-
gress mandates the restriction or cessation of trade with other
countries. This study would have a three-fold purpose:
First, the study would quantify the price the United States is will-
ing to pay to make the moral or political statement. This would fur-
ther underscore the United States determination to take "hostile"
action even though such action involves some costs to itself.
Second, the prospect of having to make out-of-pocket payments
for a political decision might dissuade the U.S. government from tak-
ing trade actions for frivolous reasons. If the imposition of trade
sanctions were perceived to be a very serious event, the sanctions
would be taken more seriously not only by the affected countries, but
also by the world community. Economic sanctions will lose their
emotional effect if used too liberally. Thus, an effective restraint on
the use of trade sanctions for political purposes would enhance their
moral suasion when the U.S. government employs them.
Third, when the U.S. government finds it necessary to impose
economic sanctions against its trading partners, part of the burden
should fall upon those who stand to benefit the most-U.S. citizens.
Domestic companies, while unable to be made entirely whole (they
will still suffer the lingering effects of perceived unreliability and
market reentry problems), should be partially compensated from
public funds. Compensation could range from outright payment to
equivalent income tax credits.
This article is not intended to outline all factors which could go
into such an economic impact statement. This analysis should, how-
ever, include considerations of historical and present levels of trade,
foreign availability, existing contracts, historical and present profits,
inventory, capital investment directly related to the trading relation-
ship, breach of contract claims, and other liabilities. The economic
impact statement would have to be prepared before the sanctions are
imposed if objectives one and two (above) are to be fulfilled. When
secrecy or national security reasons preclude this, an estimate should
be made before imposition of the sanctions, and domestic companies
should be allowed to make their specific claims at a later date. The
purpose of such a program would not be to prohibit U.S. economic
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sanctions, but to make policymakers carefully consider imposing
penalties to ensure that those who innocently stand in the way of a
foreign policy juggernaut are not irreparably injured.
In the debate over export controls, politicians have not given
serious consideration to proposals such as this. Because these per-
sons can recommend sanctions with few "downside" risks, a mind-
set has developed giving trade sanctions high priority on the list of
available retaliatory actions. In turn, the moral currency of such
sanctions has been cheapened, and the risks to U.S. businesses at
home and abroad have increased.

